Pilot, F/A-18 Hornet

You completed the longest and most expensive training pipeline in the Marine Corps and you are now a Hornet pilot in a VMFA or VMFA(AW) squadron. The F/A-18 is transitioning to the F-35 — your community is in the middle of that shift and you will live it.

As a new wingman you fly the back seat in the F/A-18D or the single-seat F/A-18C/D learning the BFM envelope, the CAS employment procedures, the SEAD picture, and the air-to-air intercept game. Your primary job is to be safe, be where you're supposed to be, and execute the tactical tasks your section lead assigns. You build hours in the sim and in the jet, accumulate flight time, and begin the qualification events that will eventually make you a section lead. You are also watching the F-35 transition happening around you — some of your peers are getting orders to VMFA-121 or VMFA-314; you're working out where you fit in that picture.

• 01F/A-18 systems — radar, JHMCS, FLIR, AIM-120/AIM-9X, JDAM/JSOW weapons systems.
• 02BFM and ACM fundamentals — one-circle/two-circle fight, offensive/defensive BFM.
• 03CAS employment — 9-line procedures, terminal attack control, talk-on and mark.
• 04SEAD/DEAD fundamentals — HTS pod employment, HARM employment basics.
• 05FAC(A) prerequisites — the qualification you will pursue at O3.

• —NAVMC 3500.14 — Fixed-Wing Attack T&R Manual.
• —NATOPS F/A-18C/D or F/A-18E/F Flight Manual — baseline for all check rides.
• —ATP 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-32D.1 — KILL BOX employment procedures (joint CAS reference).

• —Wingman designation completed within 12 months per T&R Manual — CO's readiness gate.
• —Weapons delivery qualification — minimum scores on all F/A-18 weapons systems per NATOPS.
• —NATOPS check ride — annual open-book and flight evaluation per squadron SOP.

• —Prioritizing BFM hours over CAS proficiency — Marine Hornet pilots are primarily strike/CAS platforms; the dogfighting pedigree matters but it's not why the infantry calls you.
• —Underestimating the FAC(A) qualification path — it requires significant ground time with JTACs and the groundwork starts at O2.
• —Dismissing the F-35 transition as irrelevant to your current tour — the community you're joining is changing fast, and pilots who understand both platforms have more options.

A second lieutenant who arrives at VMFA-232, earns wingman designation in 11 months, volunteers for every CAS training event available, spends two TAD weeks with a JTAC unit at 29 Palms on his own initiative, and shows up at his FAC(A) prerequisites brief already knowing the JTAC's language. His section lead tells the CO he's ready to lead sections a year before the board meets.

You are an F/A-18 section lead and, if you played this right, you are working toward or have achieved FAC(A) qualification. FAC(A) is the most significant career differentiator in the fixed-wing strike community. Pursue it.

As a captain you are a section lead flying strike, CAS, SEAD, and potentially FAC(A) missions in real operational environments. Deployment means real targets, real JTACs, real threat environments. If you're FAC(A) qualified, you are controlling other aircraft's terminal attacks while simultaneously managing your own fuel and SA — the cognitive load is the highest in the CAS enterprise. You are also training your wingman, running the squadron's section lead qualification program, and building the flight hours and documentation that will support your WTI application. The F-35 transition is a live issue at your level — you may be getting orders to a VMFA(35) or you may be one of the last Hornet-qualified captains.

• 01Section lead authority — tactical decision-making, weapons release authority.
• 02FAC(A) qualification — if achieved, airborne terminal attack control of other aircraft.
• 03SEAD/DEAD execution — coordinated HTS/HARM employment against integrated air defense.
• 04Strike planning — time-on-target coordination, deconfliction, weapons selection.
• 05WTI application preparation — demonstrating tactical competence for MAWTS-1 selection.

• —MAWTS-1 WTI Course Student Guide — the employment reference for Hornet section leads.
• —NAVMC 3500.14 — Fixed-Wing Attack T&R Manual, section lead-level events.
• —JP 3-09.3 — Close Air Support (joint doctrine your FAC(A) qualification is grounded in).

• —Section lead designation — CO endorsement, check flight with senior IP.
• —FAC(A) qualification recommended at O3 — the window narrows rapidly at O4 with staff commitments.
• —WTI attendance application submitted — competitive selection; ground your application in documented tactical performance.

• —Letting FAC(A) slip past O3 — the qualification requires ground time, JTAC coordination, and sim events that become impossible to schedule at O4 with a staff billet.
• —Treating the F-35 transition as a threat to the Hornet community rather than an opportunity — pilots who volunteer early for transition get better assignments and more options.
• —Prioritizing sorties over debrief quality — the culture of the fixed-wing strike community is built in the debrief room; a captain who briefs well and debriefs honestly is worth twice the one who just flies more sorties.

A captain who deploys to VMFA-323 aboard CVN-76, earns FAC(A) qualification in-theater during a CENTCOM deployment, controls 34 terminal attacks without an error, and returns with a WTI application endorsed by both his CO and the air wing CAG. He gets selected for WTI, attends the following spring, and earns the graduate designation. His CO calls him the best tactical pilot in the squadron.

You are a major who is running the strike operations side of a VMFA or serving at MAWTS-1 as a WTI instructor. The F-35 transition means your O4 tour may involve managing two platform types — or choosing one community definitively.

As a major you are the VMFA's S-3, XO, or the primary WTI instructor — running the flight schedule, managing readiness, and ensuring the squadron's strike tactics are current with threat changes. If you're assigned to MAWTS-1, you are teaching and revising the fixed-wing strike curriculum, engaging with the Air Force, Navy, and joint community on CAS and strike employment, and potentially writing portions of doctrine. The F-35 transition is a live organizational question — some VMFA squadrons are converting, others are not, and you are navigating your community through that shift. You are also mentoring O2-O3 pilots on FAC(A) qualification, WTI preparation, and career sequencing.

• 01Squadron operations — flight scheduling, T&R management, readiness reporting.
• 02MAWTS-1 curriculum development — if assigned, revising strike employment syllabus.
• 03F-35 transition coordination — platform qualification bridging if squadron is converting.
• 04Strike doctrine writing — formal and informal updates to VMFA employment TTPs.
• 05Officer mentorship — FAC(A) guidance, WTI preparation, command screen coaching.

• —MAWTS-1 WTI Course Director publications — strike employment doctrine.
• —NAVMC 3500.14 — Fixed-Wing Attack T&R Manual, instructor-level events.
• —F-35B NATOPS — if assigned to transitioning squadron.

• —Squadron T&R completion rate — the O4 S-3 owns this metric weekly.
• —MAWTS-1 WTI course quality — student throughput and graduate rate accountability.
• —F-35 transition readiness — if S-3 during conversion, IOC milestone compliance.

• —Refusing to engage with the F-35 transition at O4 — pilots who wait until O5 to learn the platform's employment concepts arrive at command without the credibility the new generation of O2-O3 F-35 pilots expects.
• —Letting the debrief culture atrophy during a busy ops tempo — the S-3 sets the culture; if he doesn't enforce rigorous debrief standards, the squadron's tactical quality declines.
• —Over-scheduling the flight schedule to hit FMC metrics — a tired Hornet pilot at 100% sortie completion is less valuable than a rested one at 85%.

A major who tours at MAWTS-1 as the F/A-18 strike course officer, co-writes the revised FAC(A) employment section of the WTI curriculum to incorporate F-35 integration lessons, and shepherds the first mixed Hornet/Lightning II WTI class through the course without a doctrinal gap. His MAWTS-1 CO recommends him for command screening. He screened for lieutenant colonel.

You command a VMFA or VMFA(AW) — or a VMFA transitioning to F-35. This is the command tour that defines whether you screen for colonel. The F-35 conversion complicates every readiness metric you own.

As a lieutenant colonel commanding a VMFA you own the readiness, safety, discipline, and combat capability of a Marine fighter-attack squadron. If your squadron is transitioning to F-35, you are simultaneously managing the retirement of institutional Hornet knowledge and the standup of F-35 proficiency — two different learning curves, one flight schedule. You personally engage with CVN air wing commanders on strike package integration, with MEF commanders on CAS support concepts, and with MAWTS-1 on doctrine issues your squadron has surfaced. You manage the careers of every O1-O4 in your squadron and you are making the fitrep calls that will determine their futures.

• 01Unit command — UCMJ, safety accountability, carrier air wing integration.
• 02F-35 transition management — if converting, IOC/FOC milestone accountability.
• 03Strike package integration — coordination with CVN CAG and MEF on employment.
• 04Career development — O3-O4 WTI and command screen mentorship.
• 05Safety culture — mishap board convening authority, aviation safety officer oversight.

• —OPNAVINST 3750.6 — Naval Aviation Safety Program (CO accountability for mishaps).
• —NAVMC 3500.14 — T&R Manual, commanding officer standards.
• —F-35B LRIP delivery schedule — programmatic context for your conversion timeline.

• —VMFA FMC rate reported to MAG monthly — the CO is the accountable officer.
• —Zero preventable Class A mishaps — the CO owns this standard absolutely.
• —IOC/FOC certification for F-35 transition — the CO signs the readiness certification.

• —Treating F-35 transition as an administrative burden rather than a doctrinal transformation — the employment concepts for F-35B are genuinely different from F/A-18 and a CO who doesn't lead that doctrinal shift leaves the squadron tactically behind.
• —Letting the residual Hornet pilots feel like second-class citizens during transition — the F/A-18 pilots who haven't transitioned yet still fly every day and their morale affects safety.
• —Failing to fight for your squadron's readiness resources at the MAG level — the CO who accepts inadequate maintenance funding and quietly under-reports FMC is doing his troops a disservice.

A lieutenant colonel who commands VMFA-121 during its F-35B transition, maintains an 88% FMC rate through the most disruptive period of the conversion, produces the first combat-ready F-35B squadron in the Marine Corps on schedule, and writes the classified lessons-learned document that HQMC uses to plan every subsequent VMFA conversion. He screens for colonel. He will command a MAG.

You command a Marine Aircraft Group or serve as the senior strike aviation officer at a wing or HQMC. Your Hornet/F-35 background positions you as one of the Marine Corps' most credible voices on CAS doctrine and fifth-generation integration.

As an O6 MAG commander you own multiple VMFA and other squadrons, the readiness of a mixed Hornet/F-35 fleet during transition, and the direct relationship with CVN air wing commanders and MEF commanders who depend on your strike aviation. You engage with NAVAIR and OSD on F-35 program issues, with MAWTS-1 on doctrine, and with the Air Force and Navy on joint strike employment. At HQMC you are writing the programmatic documents that shape the F-35 fleet size, the retirement schedule for the Hornet, and the Marine Corps' future fixed-wing strike concept. You are a key voice in the Force Design conversation about how many fighter-attack squadrons a future MAGTF needs.

• 01Multi-squadron command — readiness across mixed Hornet/F-35 fleet.
• 02CVN and ARG/MEU strike integration — senior engagement with joint aviation commanders.
• 03F-35 program advocacy — NAVAIR interface on fleet issues, ISP and DRS management.
• 04Force design contribution — fixed-wing strike role in distributed MAGTF architecture.
• 05Congressional engagement — strike aviation readiness testimony.

• —USMC Aviation Plan — programmatic roadmap governing F-35 fielding.
• —F-35 Program Office LRIP and LRIP+ delivery schedules — operational context.
• —USMC Force Design 2030 — framework your MAG command decisions must support.

• —MAG aggregate FMC rates across all assigned squadrons — monthly reporting to wing.
• —F-35 transition milestone compliance across subordinate VMFAs — group commander accountability.
• —Safety culture across subordinate units — a MAG with a pattern of preventable mishaps indicts the group commander.

• —Letting the F-35 transition consume all available command bandwidth at the expense of Hornet squadron readiness — until the last Hornet leaves the flight line, it is a combat asset that must be maintained.
• —Treating the Air Force's F-35 community as a competitor rather than a partner — joint employment in fifth-generation environments requires genuine collaboration on TTPs.
• —Failing to advocate loudly for the Marine Corps' unique CAS role in joint forums — in a world where the Air Force and Navy also fly F-35s, the MAGTF integration argument is the distinctly Marine contribution.

A colonel who commands MAG-11 during the peak of the Marine Corps F-35B transition, achieves the highest VMFA aggregate FMC rate in the Pacific Fleet, co-authors the Joint CAS employment concept for fifth-generation mixed-fleet operations with the Air Force WTI community, and screens for brigadier general while the F-35 program still has unresolved MEF integration questions that only a combat-experienced Hornet/F-35 pilot can answer.

You are a general officer carrying the strike aviation community's credibility into the highest levels of Marine Corps, joint, and OSD decision-making. The F-35 you helped field is now the Marine Corps' primary strike platform — what it becomes next is partly your call.

At O7 and above you serve as assistant wing commander, wing commander, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, or in joint billets at a combatant command, the Joint Staff, or OSD. Your Hornet/F-35 background gives you unmatched credibility in fixed-wing strike forums and positions you as the Marine Corps' voice on CAS doctrine, carrier aviation integration, and fifth-generation employment. You are making force structure decisions — how many VMFAs the future MAGTF needs, what comes after F-35, and how Marine fixed-wing aviation integrates with distributed maritime operations in the Pacific. At three and four stars these decisions have multi-decade consequences.

• 01Wing and MAGTF aviation command — multi-domain employment at strategic level.
• 02Joint strike employment — CCMD senior engagement on CAS and strike architecture.
• 03Next-generation aviation acquisition — post-F-35 fixed-wing strike advocacy.
• 04Force design — fixed-wing strike role in future distributed MAGTF.
• 05Congressional and SecDef engagement — NDAA and POM testimony on aviation investment.

• —National Defense Strategy — strategic context governing all force design decisions.
• —USMC Force Design 2030 and 2045 — the framework you are implementing and revising.
• —Joint Strike Fighter Program records — institutional history you are responsible for understanding.

• —Wing readiness and mishap metrics — the general officer is still the named accountable leader.
• —POM advocacy quality — requirements must survive OSD and Congressional scrutiny.
• —Legacy: the quality of the O6-O7 strike aviation leaders who follow you is your most durable contribution to the community.

• —Becoming a joint generalist too fast and losing the tactical credibility that made you a general officer in the first place — in CAS doctrine forums, the Marine who actually flew FAC(A) has a voice that a staff officer does not.
• —Treating the "what comes after F-35" question as someone else's problem — the community that doesn't advocate for its own future gets its future decided by procurement officials who never flew strike.
• —Failing to actively develop the next generation of strike aviation general officers — the community needs continuous representation at flag rank and gaps here are genuinely damaging.

A brigadier general who serves as Assistant Wing Commander at 1st MAW during the first INDOPACOM major joint exercise involving a fully F-35B-equipped MEU, co-authors the classified joint CAS doctrine for fifth-generation mixed-fleet MAGTF operations, and screens for major general while simultaneously being the most credible Marine Corps voice on the NGAD program and what it means for future carrier-based Marine strike aviation. Congress asks him to testify. He says yes and tells them the truth.