US-Vietnam Defense Partnership: From Enemies to Strategic Partners
In 1975, Saigon fell and the US-Vietnam relationship collapsed entirely. In 2023, the two countries elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, shared with China and Russia. This is that story, and what it means for the PAVN and for US service members operating in INDO-PACOM.
The historical arc: 1975 to 2023
The pace of the US-Vietnam relationship's transformation is, by any historical standard, remarkable. Consider the timeline:
The 48-year arc from total rupture to the highest diplomatic tier is not an accident of sentiment. It is a strategic calculation — by both sides — driven primarily by what China is doing in the South China Sea.
What the partnership looks like today
The US-Vietnam defense relationship is structured around several concrete programs and activities — not just diplomatic language.
Vietnamese officers attend US professional military education programs. IMET funding to Vietnam has grown substantially since 2013. This is the people-to-people layer of the relationship — PAVN officers who have studied alongside US officers.
USS Carl Vinson (2018) was a signal moment — the first carrier since the war. Regular port visits by US Navy ships to Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay have followed. These visits are logistically routine, but their symbolism is deliberately not treated as routine.
Vietnam has participated as an observer in RIMPAC, the world's largest international maritime exercise led by the US Pacific Fleet. Formal participation represents integration into the US-led maritime security architecture.
The US has provided Vietnam with metal shark patrol boats for coast guard use. This is specifically framed as maritime law enforcement rather than military transfer — a deliberate choice that lets Vietnam accept US equipment while managing the politics of the relationship with China.
US investment in clearing unexploded ordnance from the American War era continues. This is both a genuine humanitarian program and relationship-building — the physical reminder of what the US left behind, being addressed by the US.
The South China Sea factor
The honest explanation for the US-Vietnam relationship's trajectory is not reconciliation sentiment or shared democratic values — Vietnam is a single-party communist state. The honest explanation is the South China Sea.
Vietnam has stronger historical and legal claims over South China Sea features than arguably any other country except China itself. The Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claims and China has controlled since 1974 (after fighting Vietnamese forces), and the Spratly Islands, where Vietnam maintains island garrisons adjacent to Chinese-occupied features, represent an ongoing territorial dispute with real military stakes. PAVN naval infantry are deployed in the Spratlys now.
China's island-building program — constructing military installations on reef features throughout the South China Sea — is the central strategic pressure that has driven Vietnam's defense modernization and accelerated its outreach to the United States. For Vietnam, being entirely dependent on Russia for military equipment while Russia is increasingly aligned with China is a strategic problem with an obvious solution: diversify toward countries that have an interest in checking Chinese maritime expansion.
The US calculates a mirror image. A Vietnam capable of defending its South China Sea positions reduces the burden on US forces, complicates Chinese planning, and strengthens the broader network of countries in the region that resist Chinese maritime claims. The relationship is transactional and geopolitical — and that is not a criticism. It means the incentives on both sides are aligned and durable.
The Russian equipment problem
Vietnam is one of the world's largest operators of Russian military equipment. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions on Russia have created a significant modernization challenge for the PAVN.
For decades, the Soviet Union and then Russia was Vietnam's primary arms supplier. The relationship began during the American War and continued through the post-1975 period. By the time of the US arms embargo lift in 2016, Vietnam's entire military inventory — Su-30MK2 fighters, Kilo-class submarines, S-300 air defense systems, T-90S tanks, 2S19 howitzers — was overwhelmingly Russian-origin.
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the strategic calculus in two ways. First, it demonstrated Russian military limitations that gave Vietnamese planners reason to reconsider the value of Russian systems. Second, and more practically, Western sanctions on Russia have complicated Vietnam's ability to maintain, upgrade, and replace Russian equipment. Spare parts that previously flowed through normal channels now face export restrictions. Technical support contracts with Russian firms face banking and payment complications.
Vietnam is actively pursuing diversification. Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles, South Korean FA-50 light combat aircraft (discussions ongoing as of 2026), Czech VERA-NG passive radar, and US coast guard and patrol vessels all represent pieces of an effort to reduce the Russian dependency without creating a new single-source dependency.
This transition takes time. Six Kilo-class submarines, multiple Patriot-equivalent S-300 batteries, and a fleet of Su-30s do not get replaced overnight. For PAVN service members — particularly in the Air Force and Navy — the near-term reality is maintaining systems whose supply chain has been disrupted, while the longer-term strategic direction is toward diversification. The operational readiness implications are real.
What Vietnamese service members think — the generational divide
Vietnam's population is young. The median age is approximately 31. Most Vietnamese service members were born after the normalization of US-Vietnam relations in 1995. Many were born after the US trade embargo was lifted in 1994. For this generation, the American War is history, not personal experience.
The PAVN officer corps reflects this generational shift. Senior officers — those who served in the American War or the subsequent border conflicts with China (1979) and Cambodia (1978–1989) — carry a lived experience of the US as an adversary. They are retiring. The officers moving into command positions are more likely to have attended IMET programs at US institutions, participated in professional exchanges, and built personal relationships with US counterparts.
The Vietnamese Communist Party's official position — strategic autonomy, no military alliances, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil — remains unchanged and genuinely reflects Vietnamese strategic culture. Vietnam fought China, France, the United States, and Cambodia in living memory. The instinct toward independence is not performative. Even as the partnership with the US deepens, Vietnamese decision-makers are careful to maintain parallel relationships with China, Russia, and others. The phrase heard in Vietnamese strategic circles is “three nos”: no military alliances, no foreign military bases, no siding with one country against another.
In practice, the partnership has room to grow within those constraints. Joint exercises, port visits, equipment sales, and education programs can all deepen without triggering the “three nos.” The ceiling is real, but the floor has moved significantly.
For US service members working with PAVN
US service members who interact with PAVN counterparts — through IMET programs, port visits, joint exercises, or liaison assignments — encounter a military with a distinct organizational culture shaped by its history and political structure.
Every PAVN unit has a political officer alongside the military commander. This is not a formality — the political officer has real authority and is responsible for political education, morale, and ensuring the unit's alignment with Party directives. When interacting with PAVN counterparts, understanding that there is a second chain of command running in parallel is essential. The military commander may be personally collegial and professionally capable, but the political officer shapes what can be discussed and agreed to.
Vietnamese military culture places high value on face (thể diện) and hierarchical respect. Direct criticism, public disagreement with a senior, or any interaction that appears to diminish a counterpart's standing will damage the working relationship in ways that are difficult to repair. The preference is for consensus-building, private discussions, and deference to rank in formal settings.
Joint exercises with Vietnam are currently limited in scope — they focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue, and non-combatant evacuation operations. They do not involve joint strike planning, intelligence sharing at the classified level, or interoperability for combat operations. The exercises are real and valuable, but US service members should have accurate expectations about their scope.
For senior Vietnamese officers and officials, the American War is within living memory. This does not necessarily create hostility — many Vietnamese are pragmatic about the partnership — but it is present in the room. Awareness of the history, and of the Vietnamese perspective on it, is basic professional competence for US personnel working in this relationship.
Do not share classified information in reviews — exercise details, intelligence exchange arrangements, specific capabilities assessed during IMET or exchanges, or any information that could affect the US-Vietnam diplomatic or security relationship. Your honest perspective on working with PAVN counterparts or the trajectory of the partnership does not require classified information.