Skip to main content
HonestMOS
●InvestigationsHow EUCOM shelved a tax break for 9,000 troops in Poland — for five years.→
←Back to FT Fire Control Technician — overview, pay, training, civilian translation, reviews
FTE8-E9

Fire Control Technician

E-8 to E-9 (Senior NCO) · Navy

E1–E3E-4E-5E-6E-7E8–E9
HEADS UP

Senior Chief and Master Chief Fire Control Technician are the senior enlisted apex of the submarine fire control community. At SCPOFT and MCPOFT, the Navy stops sending you to school and starts sending you to flag briefings as the standard-bearer of the rate. The Senior Enlisted Academy at the Naval War College Newport RI is the institutional PME gate; the Command Master Chief and Chief of the Boat billets are the apex senior enlisted leadership roles that open at this level. The fire control community is small enough that the MCPOFT is known by reputation across the submarine force before the promotion posts.

The Honest MOS Read
Senior Chief Fire Control Technician (SCPOFT, E-8) and Master Chief Fire Control Technician (MCPOFT, E-9) are the apex enlisted ranks of a rating that exists only in the submarine force — one of the most selective, most technically demanding, and most operationally significant enlisted communities in the United States Navy. The structural distance between E-8 and E-9 in the FT rate is narrower in pay grade than it is in institutional weight; the Master Chief who holds the COB or Force Master Chief seat operates at a level that is visible to COMSUBFOR, SUBLANT, and SUBPAC commands. As SCPOFT, you run the senior enlisted fire control and weapons readiness posture for a submarine squadron (SUBRON), a major submarine maintenance and readiness command, a COMSUBFOR or SUBLANT/SUBPAC staff, a submarine training command, or you sit as Command Master Chief / Chief of the Boat at a larger command. You write fewer eEVALs than you did as CPOFT, but they are the ones that determine which CPOFTs select to SCPOFT and which SCPOFTS make MCPOFT. You sit at command-team sync as the senior enlisted voice on every enlisted weapons and fire control decision — accession, NEC programming, training throughput, retention, certification-currency posture across the boats and squadrons you cover. The brief audience has changed since the LCPO tour. As SCPOFT or MCPOFT, you translate COMSUBFOR, SUBLANT/SUBPAC, and NAVSEA submarine weapons strategy into command-level enlisted talent and readiness decisions. The readiness assessment or the SIB investigation you walk as the senior enlisted fire control voice is being briefed by the weapons officer to the squadron commander, and eventually to a flag officer. Your AAR from that assessment is what the weapons officer briefs up the chain without rewriting, because at this level the senior enlisted voice is expected to produce flag-brief-ready analysis, not summaries that require translation. The post-Navy transition planning begins 24-36 months before the planned retirement date — not at the separation physical. The defense contractor community that hires former submarine FTs at the SCPOFT and MCPOFT level includes General Dynamics Mission Systems (Electric Boat division), Raytheon Intelligence and Space, BAE Systems, L3Harris Technologies, and a range of NAVSEA-adjacent program support contractors working on submarine fire control and weapons systems. Federal civilian positions at NAVSEA, NUWC (Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport RI), or COMSUBFOR's readiness staff are available for MCPOFTs who prefer the civil service path. Nuclear power industry positions are available for those with dual submarine qualifications who have maintained nuclear-related technical currency. The bench you leave behind — the CPOFTs and SCPOFTs you developed into the next generation of submarine fire control senior enlisted leadership — is part of what the submarine force and the defense contractor community remember about the standard you held.
Career Arc
  • 01Pin SCPOFT; assume senior enlisted fire control role at SUBRON, major command, or staff; conduct a full readiness assessment of the enlisted FCS and weapons-handling posture across the commands in the portfolio.
  • 02Complete Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA) at the Naval War College Newport RI — the institutional PME gate for SCPOFT and MCPOFT tiers; the curriculum covers strategic leadership, policy, and joint doctrine at the senior enlisted advisory level.
  • 03Brief the squadron commander, COMSUBFOR, or SUBLANT/SUBPAC on enlisted fire control readiness risk — NEC billet fill, training throughput, retention cliff, certification-currency posture — in language the flag officer can defend at the next echelon.
  • 04Produce at least one CMC or COB selection, one SCPOFT advancement, and one commissioning or LDO/CWO program placement per year from the commands in the portfolio.
  • 05Walk a COMSUBFOR or SUBLANT/SUBPAC weapons readiness assessment or SIB as the senior enlisted fire control voice on scene; deliver the AAR the squadron commander can brief at the next echelon without rewriting.
  • 06Begin post-Navy transition planning at 24 months: engage General Dynamics/Electric Boat, Raytheon, BAE Systems, NAVSEA civilian programs, and NUWC before the 12-month mark.
  • 07Brief the COB/CMC candidly on the enlisted FCS community's talent pipeline — which CPOFTs are developing into the next senior chiefs, where the NEC fill gaps are, and what the force needs to build to maintain the standard.
Common Screwups
  • ×Pretending to be the current technical authority on a fire control system baseline or weapons variant you are a version behind. Senior FTs — including the FT2 who just completed the most recent training pipeline — will see the gap in the first readiness brief; the MCPOFT who fakes technical depth loses credibility faster in the submarine community than in any other community because the community is small and the technical standard is unforgiving.
  • ×Letting a CPOFT-led fire control division drift on weapons-handling certification currency or FCS readiness reporting because the inspection schedule is comfortable. The SCPOFT or MCPOFT who discovers a weapons-handling safety failure that a proactive readiness culture would have prevented owns the failure at the senior-enlisted roll-up, and the real-world consequence of a weapons-handling safety incident in a submarine torpedo room does not have a good outcome at any severity level.
  • ×Treating the commissioning, LDO/defense-contractor mentoring conversation as transactional — a checkbox that produces names for the fitness report rather than genuine development of the fire control community's next generation. The FTs the MCPOFT credentials and commissions build the submarine warfare officer community and the defense industrial base that the submarine force depends on for the next generation of fire control systems.
  • ×Going public with disagreement with the CO, the squadron commander, or COMSUBFOR. Take it in the office. Walk out aligned. At MCPOFT the standard is absolute; the goat locker, the wardroom, and the flag-level community all enforce it, and the MCPOFT's fitness report language reflects every instance of the pattern.
  • ×Confusing the warm-up to retirement with the job. The submarine force reads which one you are on the last three fitness reports and the command endorsement language. The defense contractor community makes the same read on the final fitness report and on the reputation in the goat locker that follows the name after the retirement ceremony.

A Day in the Life

  • 0530Wake; review overnight readiness reports from the commands in the portfolio. At MCPOFT, the operational picture spans multiple boats and squadrons; overnight changes in readiness status need to be known before the morning command-team brief.
  • 0600–0700Physical training. Senior enlisted leaders who maintain physical readiness through the SCPOFT and MCPOFT tiers build the credibility to hold the standard on every FT in the community.
  • 0700–0800Review of the day's command-team and readiness brief schedules. The MCPOFT's day is structured around the brief cycles at the command and squadron level, not around the division maintenance schedule.
  • 0800–0930Command-team or squadron readiness sync: the MCPOFT sits as the senior enlisted voice on weapons and fire control readiness at the command-team level. Brief from the portfolio analysis, not from a division-level summary.
  • 0930–1130Portfolio management: review CPOFT readiness reports from the boats in the portfolio, update the NEC billet fill and certification currency tracking at the squadron roll-up level, identify any gaps that require action before the next scheduled assessment.
  • 1130–1300Lunch. The MCPOFT's mess interactions at the fleet and force level build the institutional relationships that translate strategy into action at the command level.
  • 1300–1500Mentoring sessions with CPOFTs pursuing SCPOFT, SCPOFTs under consideration for CMC or Force Master Chief billets, or development conversations with FT1 LPOs identified as Chief-board-competitive by the CPOFT in the portfolio review.
  • 1500–1630Fleet or force-level working group, NAVSEA program review, or COMSUBFOR readiness analysis support — the MCPOFT's analytical contribution at this level is the translation from technical system knowledge to senior enlisted workforce implication.
  • 1630–1730End-of-day: update the portfolio readiness tracking, identify any issues that require CO or squadron commander awareness before the next morning's brief, review the draft AAR from any assessment completed this week.
  • 1800–2000Post-Navy transition network maintenance — engagement with General Dynamics/Electric Boat, Raytheon, NAVSEA civilian program offices, or NUWC Newport contacts. The MCPOFT who builds the post-Navy network 24 months before separation does not arrive at the transition office as a cold contact.
  • 2000–2200SEA reading list study, CMC/Force Master Chief symposium preparation, or fitness report documentation for the SCPOFT portfolio. The MCPOFT who maintains intellectual engagement with the strategic-advisory materials at this level arrives at senior-level briefs as a participant, not a guest.

Weekly Cadence

The SCPOFT and MCPOFT week is structured around the readiness assessment cycle, the evaluation period, and the command-level leadership rhythms — not the boat's maintenance production schedule. The weekly cadence at the senior enlisted apex is brief cycles, portfolio reviews, development conversations, and external stakeholder engagement in roughly equal measure. The readiness brief to the squadron commander is the primary weekly accountability mechanism; the evaluation input for the CPOFTs in the portfolio is the primary monthly cycle; the commissioning and advanced-qualification placement pipeline is the quarterly metric the MCPOFT manages proactively. The week during a COMSUBFOR or SUBLANT/SUBPAC weapons readiness assessment or a SIB is compressed and intensive. Every readiness data point across the portfolio is being reviewed simultaneously by the assessment team and by the MCPOFT's own analysis. The MCPOFT who has been maintaining portfolio readiness monitoring continuously arrives at the assessment week with a clean picture and an AAR ready to draft; the one who begins the picture-building at the start of assessment week does not finish the AAR at a quality the squadron commander can brief without rewriting. Looking toward transition, the final twelve months of the MCPOFT tour are the months when the post-Navy network is being activated rather than built. Informational conversations with defense contractor program managers, civil service HR contacts, and NUWC or NAVSEA program office supervisors are happening during this window. The MCPOFT who starts these conversations at the twelve-month mark has the time to navigate the hiring process deliberately; the one who starts at the six-month mark often has to accept the first available position rather than the right one.

Key Skills — How to Drill Each

  1. 01
    Run a senior enlisted command climate across a submarine squadron or major command that produces credentialed FTs, commissioning selectees, and retention rates above the submarine force average.
    The command climate runs through what you enforce and what you let pass. At SCPOFT and MCPOFT, you are not running a division — you are setting the standard across multiple CPOFTs and FT1 LPOs. The mechanism is the senior enlisted leadership network: the CPOFTs in the commands you cover take their cue from the standards you hold them to at the quarterly readiness review and the annual evaluation conference. The SCPOFT who shows up to the quarterly review with specific development-outcome tracking for each CPOFT — commissioning placements, advanced NEC completions, retention rates, Chief board outcomes — is the SCPOFT whose CPOFTs produce those outcomes. The one who reviews the maintenance board and the certification currency but not the people-development picture produces maintenance compliance and talent attrition simultaneously.
  2. 02
    Brief the CO, squadron commander, COMSUBFOR, or SUBLANT/SUBPAC on enlisted fire control and weapons readiness risk in language the flag officer can defend at the next echelon without rewriting.
    The flag-brief-ready analysis does not emerge from the day of the brief — it is built from continuous readiness monitoring across the commands in the portfolio and translated into the decision-relevant summary the flag officer needs. The brief structure: what the current posture is, what the risk is if the posture does not improve, what specific action is required, and what the timeline is. No hedging, no optimism that is not supported by the data, and no surprises that should have been briefed earlier. The MCPOFT who gives a flag officer a surprise during a readiness brief has not been managing the portfolio — they have been managing the brief.
  3. 03
    Sit on Chief selection board panels, command CMC slates, and commissioning accession panels with the discipline and confidentiality the convening authority requires.
    Board discipline means the deliberation stays in the room, the decision criteria are applied consistently across all records, and the recommendation reflects the actual record rather than the relationship. The SCPOFT or MCPOFT who participates in selection boards has access to information about sailors' evaluated records that is not shared outside the board; the handling of that information is part of the institutional credibility of the selection process. The board participant who discusses board deliberations outside the room destroys the process integrity in a community small enough that the discussion reaches the candidates.
  4. 04
    Translate COMSUBFOR, SUBLANT/SUBPAC, and NAVSEA submarine weapons strategy into enlisted talent management, NEC programming, and training throughput decisions at the command level.
    Strategy translation at the senior enlisted level means reading the force-level guidance — NAVADMIN cycles, COMSUBFOR readiness directives, NAVSEA weapons system updates — and identifying the talent management and training implications before they become readiness gaps. If COMSUBFOR is upgrading a fire control system baseline, the NEC programming required to man the upgraded system needs to be in the quota request twelve months before the boats start transitioning. The MCPOFT who reads the strategic guidance and translates it into specific NEC, school, and billet actions at the command level is the one the squadron commander calls when the SUBPAC readiness brief requires a senior enlisted analytical contribution.
  5. 05
    Walk a COMSUBFOR or SUBLANT/SUBPAC weapons readiness assessment or SIB as the senior enlisted fire control voice on scene and deliver the AAR the squadron commander can brief at the next echelon.
    The AAR from a readiness assessment is the MCPOFT's analytical product — the specific findings, the enlisted accountability mapping, the corrective action recommendations, and the timeline projections. Deliver it in writing, at a level of specificity that the squadron commander does not need to ask follow-up questions to use. The MCPOFT's written AAR from a readiness assessment is a primary evidence document in any future investigation that references the assessment; write it with the awareness that it will be read in contexts you cannot anticipate.

Manuals & References — What Chapters Matter

  • COMSUBFOR / SUBLANT / SUBPAC operational instructions and applicable NAVSEAINST 8000-series submarine weapons and ordnance governance
    At SCPOFT and MCPOFT, you are cited from these more often than you cite them. Knowing the governance architecture — which instruction governs which aspect of submarine weapons and fire control readiness — is the baseline from which the senior-enlisted technical advisory role operates. When the squadron commander asks why a specific readiness threshold exists, the MCPOFT who can explain the underlying safety logic from the applicable instruction is the one whose advice the commander acts on.
  • NAVSEA OD 45845 (or current equivalent) — Submarine Weapons and Ordnance System Safety Manual
    You enforce this document's standards across the submarine force at the senior-enlisted roll-up level. The safety culture in every torpedo room in the commands you cover runs partly through the standard you hold CPOFTs to at the quarterly review. Knowing the document's logic — the failure mode each procedure was written to prevent — means you can identify a procedural drift before it becomes an incident, not only after.
  • Fire control system technical manuals and MK 48 ADCAP torpedo documentation
    The MCPOFT who maintains technical currency on the FCS baseline and torpedo documentation is the one the weapons officer, the program manager, and the SIB call as the senior enlisted technical conscience. Losing this currency at the MCPOFT level — because the management work fills the day — produces an MCPOFT who can speak to the policy without being able to speak to the system. In a community as technically demanding as submarine fire control, that gap is visible.
  • Senior Enlisted Academy (Naval War College, Newport RI) reading list and CMC / Force Master Chief symposium materials
    The SEA curriculum is the intellectual foundation for operating at the senior enlisted advisory level across a joint and combined environment. The reading list — strategy, policy, organizational leadership, joint doctrine — is the material the SCPOFT and MCPOFT consume and translate into the enlisted leadership context. The symposium materials from CMC and Force Master Chief forums carry the institutional perspective of the senior-most enlisted leaders across the Navy and the joint force.
  • MILPERSMAN — fluent in personnel actions at the senior-enlisted threshold: NJP, separation, high-visibility weapons-handling safety investigations
    At SCPOFT and MCPOFT, you are in the room for the high-visibility personnel actions — the NJP proceeding that involves a submarine weapons-handling safety incident, the separation proceeding for a CPOFT whose conduct has compromised the command's OPSEC posture, the retention decision for an FT1 whose clearance is under adjudication review. Knowing the MILPERSMAN framework at the depth required to participate in these conversations accurately is the standard.

Standards — How to Hit Each

  • SEA fellowship or equivalent senior enlisted PME complete before competing for Command Master Chief or Force Master Chief slate.
    The Senior Enlisted Academy application window is a competitive process; the SCPOFT who applies early and from a strong record — demonstrated LCPO performance, CPOFT pipeline production, CO endorsement — is competitive. The SEA curriculum is not a reward for seniority; it is preparation for operating at the strategic-advisory level the CMC and Force Master Chief billets require. Treat the application process and the fellowship itself with the seriousness the Naval War College curriculum deserves.
  • Squadron-level COMSUBFOR or SUBLANT/SUBPAC weapons readiness assessment passed without senior-enlisted-attributable findings during SCPOFT tenure.
    The readiness assessment is the primary external accountability mechanism for the weapons program the SCPOFT oversees. The standard is 'no senior-enlisted-attributable findings' — not 'no findings' overall, but no findings that trace to the enlisted leadership's execution gaps. Achieve this by maintaining continuous readiness monitoring across the boats in the portfolio, not by intensive last-week preparation before the assessment team arrives.
  • Commissioning program, LDO/CWO, and advanced-qualification accession pipeline producing at least one selectee per year from the command — and the squadron commander can name them.
    The pipeline production metric is not the number of applications submitted — it is the number of selectees produced. Selectees are produced by development work that began eighteen months before the application window: identifying the candidate, building the record, and preparing the package and the CO endorsement. The MCPOFT who can tell the squadron commander which CPOFT is on track for SCPOFT, which FT1 is tracking for the LDO program, and which FT2 is in the defense-contractor credentialing pipeline is the MCPOFT who is managing the pipeline, not just observing it.

Technical Mistakes — Concrete Consequences

  • Pretending to be current on a FCS baseline or weapons variant you are a version behind.
    The submarine fire control community is small enough that the MCPOFT's technical credibility is maintained by demonstrated accuracy or lost by demonstrated inaccuracy — and the community does not require multiple exposures to reach a verdict. The FT2 who knows the current baseline better than the MCPOFT does not announce it in the brief; he announces it in the goat locker conversation afterward, and the word travels in a community where the CPOFTs talk to each other across squadrons.
  • Letting a CPOFT-led fire control division drift on weapons-handling certification currency or FCS readiness reporting.
    A weapons-handling safety failure in a submarine torpedo room is not a recoverable incident at any level of severity. The MCPOFT who owns the enlisted weapons-handling program at the senior-enlisted roll-up level is the first name in the SIB's chain-of-accountability analysis when the question of who maintained the culture that produced the incident is asked. The answer 'the CPOFT was responsible' does not end the analysis at the CPOFT level when the MCPOFT was present and not correcting.
  • Treating mentoring as transactional — producing names for the fitness report rather than genuine development work.
    The defense contractor community that hires former submarine FTs makes its hiring decisions partly based on the reputation the MCPOFT's name carries in the submarine warfare community. The MCPOFT who was known for genuine development work — for producing CPOFTs who led effectively, for commissioning officers who became competent submarine warfare officers, for LDOs who advanced on merit — receives calls from the programs that matter. The one who produced names for the fitness report without the development work behind them receives the call too, but not from the same programs.
  • Confusing the warm-up to retirement with the job.
    The submarine force reads the last three fitness reports and the command endorsement language with the same scrutiny as the first three. The MCPOFT who coasts into retirement — managing perception rather than outcomes in the final eighteen months — leaves a record the defense contractor community and the civilian federal service both read. The submarine fire control rating is small enough that the name and the reputation carry into the post-Navy career in ways that most other communities do not experience.

Career Decisions at This Rank

  • Pursue Command Master Chief / Chief of the Boat billet or remain in a technical senior enlisted advisory role.
    The CMC and COB billets are the apex senior enlisted leadership roles in the submarine force — the CO's senior enlisted advisor, the interface between the wardroom and the goat locker at the command level, and the primary enlisted leadership voice for the command's sailors. The path to CMC/COB requires the CO's endorsement, strong evaluated record, SEA completion, and the institutional reputation in the goat locker that the sea-detail placement board reflects. Not every SCPOFT or MCPOFT pursues the CMC/COB path; the technical senior enlisted advisory role — at COMSUBFOR, SUBLANT/SUBPAC, NAVSEA, or NUWC — is a legitimate and respected career trajectory that values the FT technical depth the community requires.
  • Defense contractor transition (General Dynamics/Electric Boat, Raytheon, BAE Systems, L3Harris) vs. federal civilian service vs. nuclear power industry.
    The three primary post-Navy paths for SCPOFT and MCPOFT grade FTs carry different employment models, compensation structures, and lifestyle implications. Defense contractors offer the highest immediate compensation, particularly in program support and technical advisory roles aligned with submarine fire control systems, but the work is contingent on contract continuation and program funding. Federal civilian service (NAVSEA, NUWC Newport, COMSUBFOR staff) offers stability and benefit continuity but typically starts below defense contractor salary and advances on the GS scale (GS-11 to GS-14 range for MCPOFT equivalents). Nuclear power industry positions (commercial power plants, reactor services) are available for those with dual submarine qualifications — check current NRC licensing and utility hiring pathways before the 24-month mark. Verify current compensation data from each pathway independently; the specific figures change with contracting cycles and federal pay tables.
  • Submit for Fleet / Force Master Chief consideration.
    The Fleet Master Chief and Force Master Chief tier is the pinnacle of the enlisted Navy — a limited number of positions serving as the senior enlisted advisors to fleet and force commanders. Selection is through a centralized MILPERSMAN process that reviews the full evaluated record, including the SEA fellowship, the command-level endorsements, and the institutional reputation across the submarine and broader naval community. The MCPOFT who has been building this record deliberately — with CMC or COB performance, demonstrated strategic-advisory capability, and a national-level network in the submarine warfare community — is competitive. The MCPOFT who has not explicitly pursued the prerequisites is not positioned for the Force Master Chief slate, and the decision to pursue it needs to be made at the SCPOFT level with enough lead time to build the required record.

How the Seat Varies by Unit Type

  • Submarine Squadron (SUBRON) senior enlisted billet
    The standard SCPOFT assignment. You oversee the senior enlisted fire control and weapons-handling posture across the boats in the squadron. The weekly accountability mechanism is the readiness brief cycle; the quarterly mechanism is the development outcome review for the CPOFTs in the portfolio. The SUBRON senior enlisted billet is the tour the MCPOFT board expects to see in the record.
  • COMSUBFOR / SUBLANT / SUBPAC staff senior enlisted billet
    A staff billet at the operational command level provides the enterprise-wide view of the submarine fire control community — NEC programming, training throughput, certification standards, weapons system transitions. The work is analytical and advisory rather than operational and deckplate. Evaluation language emphasizes policy influence, enterprise-level analysis, and strategic advisory impact. Strong staff billet performance combined with a strong LCPO and SUBRON tour produces the breadth the MCPOFT board values.
  • NAVSEA / NUWC program office senior enlisted billet
    An MCPOFT assigned to a NAVSEA submarine weapons program office or NUWC Newport provides the senior enlisted technical perspective to weapons system development, acquisition, and sustainment programs. The work involves interface with defense contractors, program managers, and system engineers on fire control system upgrades and modifications. This billet builds the post-Navy network that translates directly into defense contractor employment — the program managers and system engineers encountered in this role are the same people making hiring decisions in the industry.
  • Command Master Chief (CMC) / Chief of the Boat (COB) billet
    The CMC and COB billets change the scope from 'senior enlisted fire control technical advisor' to 'senior enlisted command leader.' The COB on a submarine is the CO's senior enlisted advisor across all enlisted matters — not just fire control, but the entire enlisted community on the boat. The CMC at a shore command or major staff covers the same breadth. The transition from technical rating MCPOFT to command CMC requires the institutional breadth and the leadership credibility that the Chief's mess has been building since the anchors were pinned — the technical depth remains valuable, but it is no longer the primary credential.

What Good Looks Like at This Rank

The good Master Chief Fire Control Technician is the senior enlisted weapons and fire control voice the CO, the squadron commander, and COMSUBFOR all name without thinking. His name appears in the readiness brief because something he built is being cited as the standard — not because something in his portfolio required attention. His command's FT advancement slate is the one the force quotes at the annual readiness conference. His commissioning and defense-contractor accession rate is in the upper third of the FT rate community. His rated CPOFTs pin Senior Chief and Master Chief on schedule and their commands are the ones that pass the inspection without attributable findings. The weapons-handling safety culture across the boats in his purview is the one the COMSUBFOR staff uses when it is explaining to other squadrons what the standard is supposed to look like. When the MCPOFT walks into a squadron readiness review, the CPOFTs in the room have already reviewed their maintenance boards, updated their certification currency trackers, and prepared their readiness inputs — not because they are afraid of the MCPOFT, but because the standard has been established clearly enough that they know what prepared looks like before being asked. The MCPOFT who produces that kind of preparedness in the people around them is the one who has done the development work, not the oversight work. When the retirement ceremony comes, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and BAE Systems already have the MCPOFT's number — not because of a LinkedIn profile, but because of the program support relationships built during the last six years at the COMSUBFOR and NAVSEA interface. The submarine goat locker remembers the standard that was left behind, not the position that was held. The difference between those two legacies is the difference between an MCPOFT who did the job and one who managed the perception of the job.

Preview — The Next Rank

Beyond MCPOFT, the paths are Fleet Master Chief, Force Master Chief, or the transition to the post-Navy career. The Fleet and Force Master Chief positions are the senior-most enlisted roles in the Navy — a very small number of sailors reach them, and those who do have built the record, the network, and the institutional credibility over a twenty-plus-year career that the selection process reflects accurately. For most MCPOFTs, the 'next level' is the transition itself — and the post-Navy career is the next professional chapter that the submarine fire control community's technical depth, the evaluated leadership record, and the network built over the career position exceptionally well. The defense contractor, the federal civil service, and the nuclear industry pathways are specific and navigable for the MCPOFT who begins the transition planning at 24 months and engages the network deliberately. The legacy the MCPOFT leaves in the rate is the standard that the next generation of CPOFTs and SCPOFTs operates against. The submarine goat locker is a small enough institution that the standard held by the previous Master Chiefs is known by name — the MCPOFT whose name is associated with a clean weapons-handling culture, a productive development pipeline, and a readiness posture that held under scrutiny is the standard the next generation is measured against. That legacy is built one patrol, one evaluation cycle, one mentoring conversation at a time — and it does not start at MCPOFT. It starts at the torpedo room preventive maintenance evolution that the FTSN got right because the qualified FT who was watching held the standard.
FAQ

FT E8-E9 — Frequently Asked Questions

Q01What does a E8-E9 FT (Fire Control Technician) actually do?
As SCPOFT or MCPOFT you run the senior enlisted fire control and weapons readiness posture for a submarine squadron (SUBRON), a major submarine command, a COMSUBFOR or SUBLANT/SUBPAC maintenance and readiness staff, a submarine training command, or you sit as Command Master Chief where the path opens.
Q02What's the most important thing to know as a E8-E9 FT?
Senior Chief and Master Chief Fire Control Technician are the senior enlisted apex of the submarine fire control community.
Q03What does a typical day look like for a E8-E9 FT?
Time-blocked day at the E8-E9 FT rank tier: 0530 Wake; review overnight readiness reports from the commands in the portfolio. At MCPOFT, the operational picture spans multiple boats and squadrons; overnight changes in readiness status need to be known before the morning command-team brief, 0600–0700 Physical training. Senior enlisted leaders who maintain physical readiness through the SCPOFT and MCPOFT tiers build the credibility to hold the standard on every FT in the community, 0700–0800 Review of the day's command-team and readiness brief schedules.…
Q04What mistakes get E8-E9 FT soldiers fired or relieved?
Pretending to be the current technical authority on a fire control system baseline or weapons variant you are a version behind. Senior FTs — including the FT2 who just completed the most recent training pipeline — will see the gap in the first readiness brief; the MCPOFT who fakes technical depth loses credibility faster in the submarine community than in any other community because the community is small and the technical standard is unforgiving;…
Q05What career decisions matter most at the E8-E9 FT rank tier?
Pursue Command Master Chief / Chief of the Boat billet or remain in a technical senior enlisted advisory role — The CMC and COB billets are the apex senior enlisted leadership roles in the submarine force — the CO's senior enlisted advisor, the interface between the wardroom and the goat locker at the command level, and the primary enlisted leadership voice for the command's sailors. The path to CMC/COB requires the CO's endorsement, strong evaluated record, SEA completion, and the institutional reputation in the goat locker that the sea-detail placement board reflects.…
Q06What's next after E8-E9 for a FT (Fire Control Technician) in the Navy?
Beyond MCPOFT, the paths are Fleet Master Chief, Force Master Chief, or the transition to the post-Navy career.
Q07What manuals and regulations does a E8-E9 FT need to know cold?
COMSUBFOR / SUBLANT / SUBPAC operational instructions and the applicable NAVSEAINST 8000-series submarine weapons and ordnance governance — you are cited from these more often than you cite them at this level.; NAVSEA OD 45845 (or current equivalent) — Submarine Weapons and Ordnance System Safety Manual: the safety governance you enforce across the submarine force at senior-enlisted roll-up.;…

This playbook has no tips yet. Be the first to share what you know.

Published by the Honest MOS Editorial DeskVerified against DoD/.gov sourcesUpdated May 2026Editorial standards