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FTE6

Fire Control Technician

E-6 (Staff Sergeant) · Navy

E1–E3E-4E-5E-6E-7E8–E9
HEADS UP

FT1 is the LPO billet and the Chief packet year — simultaneously. The weapons officer and the LCPO are both forming opinions about you based on the same observable: how you carry the division. The FT1 who separates the 'LPO performance' conversation from the 'Chief packet' conversation does not understand that they are the same conversation. Every eEVAL you write, every weapons-handling evolution you run, every commissioning candidate you produce is simultaneously division performance and Chief board record. If you are not building both from day one of the FT1 tour, you are already behind on one of them.

The Honest MOS Read
First Class Petty Officer Fire Control Technician is the LPO billet in the submarine fire control community, and the weight of it lands harder than most FT3s imagined it would when they were watching the previous FT1 from the maintenance bench. You are now the previous FT1 — the one the FT3s are watching, the one the weapons officer calls first, the one the LCPO uses as the senior enlisted execution layer between the goat locker's direction and the division's daily output. Running the division means running the maintenance schedule, the qualification currency, the weapons-handling certification posture, and the personnel — simultaneously, with the LCPO watching the readiness metrics and the weapons officer watching whether the brief holds up at the weapons readiness board. The fire control system readiness and torpedo tube operability brief the department head presents to the XO is built from the data you produce and defend at the division level. If the brief has a caveat — a system degraded, a certification lapsed, a qualification overdue — the first question the weapons officer asks is whether the FT1 knew about it before the brief and why it was not already being fixed. The eEVAL writing responsibility at FT1 is where most FTIs discover they were not trained for this part of the job. Four to six eEVALs per cycle for FT2s and FT3s whose advancement, retention, and professional trajectory you are shaping with your language choices. The eEVAL block that says 'excellent performance, recommend for advancement' without specific outcomes, measurable results, and documented leadership contributions is the eEVAL the chief has to rewrite. The FT1 who writes defensible eEVALs — with action-result-impact language, with named outcomes, with advancement and commissioning and qualification results that a selection board can read directly from the bullet — is the FT1 the LCPO lets edit the block rather than starting over. The Chief packet construction is the background work of the FT1 tour that the weapons officer and the LCPO are both evaluating. The packet is built from: the evaluated record across FT1 (and the whole career), the CO's endorsement, the commissioning and advanced-qualification pipeline you produce, the weapons-handling safety culture you maintain, and the goat locker's read on whether you carry the chief standard before the anchors land. The FT1 who produces a commissioning program selectee, an LDO/CWO candidate, or an advanced NEC completion from the division gives the chief concrete evidence for the packet endorsement. The one who manages the division adequately but produces nothing distinctive is the FT1 whose packet narrative depends entirely on what the chief decides to write — and what the chief decides to write is often a reflection of what actually happened, not what the FT1 wished had happened. The OPSEC culture of the division runs through you at FT1. The FTs in your section take their cue from what you enforce and what you let slide. One FT3 who talks carelessly about the boat's operations ashore is an OPSEC incident the FT1 owns on the next evaluation. The FT1 who sets the standard in the division — who has the direct conversation with the FT3 before anything is disclosed, not after — is the one whose division does not generate OPSEC incidents.
Career Arc
  • 01Pin FT1; assume LPO role immediately; receive the division's maintenance board, weapons-handling certification tracker, and qualification currency status from the previous FT1 on the day of transfer.
  • 02Conduct a full division readiness audit within the first thirty days: open 3-M discrepancies and their age, certification currency gaps, qualification milestone status for every FT in the division.
  • 03Write the first eEVAL cycle for the FT2s and FT3s; send them to the LCPO for input and be prepared to rewrite; the first cycle is the education in what 'defensible eEVAL language' means.
  • 04Produce at least one commissioning program, advanced NEC, or defense-contractor credentialing placement from the division during the FT1 tour — start identifying who is tracking toward these pipelines in the first ninety days.
  • 05Sit the Chief board with a packet the LCPO has endorsed and the weapons officer has not qualified: the CO's endorsement language is concrete and specific, not generic.
  • 06Earn the advanced fire control watchstander and weapons coordinator qualifications that make you the senior enlisted fire control voice during real-world operations.
  • 07Brief the LCPO candidly about which FT2 is ready to assume the LPO role and begin transferring institutional knowledge at the twelve-month mark — the division should not depend on you personally to maintain its readiness posture.
Common Screwups
  • ×Briefing FCS readiness numbers to the weapons officer that you have not personally validated from the 3-M system and the current maintenance log. The weapons officer catches the discrepancy once; the Chief packet reflects it permanently in the 'leadership judgment' trait.
  • ×Allowing a certification lapse — an FT whose weapons-handling certification expired and was not tracked — to surface during a tactical readiness evaluation rather than being caught by the LPO's tracking system. The finding lands under the FT1's name; the LCPO's explanation begins with 'the LPO did not maintain currency tracking.'
  • ×Writing eEVAL blocks that are generic in language and thin on measurable outcomes. A board reviewer who reads 'outstanding performance in all areas' without supporting evidence cannot differentiate this sailor from the forty others whose eEVALs say the same thing. The FT1's eEVAL block is the written argument for advancement; if it cannot make the argument on its own, it has not been written.
  • ×Going around the LCPO to the weapons officer or the XO on a division readiness or personnel issue. The chief hears about it before the weapons officer finishes the conversation; the pattern shows up in the FT1's leadership trait rating at the next evaluation cycle.
  • ×Treating the OPSEC culture as someone else's enforcement responsibility. The FT1 who does not address a junior FT's careless comment about the boat's operations — because it did not seem serious enough to address directly — owns the incident when it surfaces as a reportable OPSEC violation.

A Day in the Life

  • 0530Wake; review the overnight maintenance log and any discrepancies that came up on watch. If duty section ran an evolution overnight, review the 3-M entries before quarters.
  • 0600–0630Morning quarters: brief the division on the plan of the day, assign maintenance tasks to FT2s and FT3s, announce qualification sign-off opportunities, and communicate any readiness items that will affect the day's schedule.
  • 0630–0800Physical training. FT1 leads from the front on PT; the division watches whether the LPO shows up to PT the same way they expect the FT3s to show up.
  • 0800–0900Division production review: update the maintenance board with overnight status, review parts pipeline for any open discrepancies, verify certification currency against the week's scheduled evolutions. Brief the LCPO on anything that affects the daily weapons readiness brief.
  • 0900–1000Weapons readiness brief input preparation: compile section readiness status, system-by-system, with open discrepancies and their ages, parts status, and projected resolution dates. This is the input the department head briefs to the XO; it needs to be accurate and complete before the 1000 brief.
  • 1000–1130Weapons officer or department head weapons readiness brief; defend the FT division's posture and answer questions about deferred items, certification gaps, and qualification milestones.
  • 1130–1300Maintenance supervision: walk the torpedo room and FCS maintenance spaces, observe FT2 fault isolation or FT3 PM evolutions, countersign completed 3-M entries after actual review, brief section chief on status.
  • 1300–1500eEVAL writing, mentoring conversations with FT2s pursuing advanced qualifications or commissioning programs, or qualification board preparation for an FT3 approaching a board. The LPO's afternoon is administrative in a way the FT2's afternoon is not.
  • 1500–1630Torpedo load/offload evolution (if scheduled) or weapons-handling certification training. FT1 leads the evolution safety brief and commands the team leader position or supervises the FT2 team leader directly.
  • 1630–1700End of day: verify all 3-M entries are closed, update the maintenance board, brief the LCPO on anything deferred or open that needs to be carried into the next day's plan.
  • 1700–2000Personal time or duty section. If duty, available for any weapons or fire control discrepancy that requires LPO-level resolution overnight.
  • 2000–2200Chief packet documentation, eEVAL drafting for the upcoming cycle, or mentoring preparation for next day's FT2 career counseling sessions. The FT1 who spends this time on professional development rather than unwinding is the one whose Chief packet narrative writes itself.

Weekly Cadence

The FT1's week is not primarily a maintenance execution week — it is a maintenance oversight, personnel development, and readiness defense week. The difference is visibility: the maintenance board is tracked, the certification currency is verified, the qualification milestones are monitored, and the eEVAL language is drafted on a rolling basis. The LPO who arrives at Friday with no surprises on any of those four fronts had a successful week; the one who discovers a certification gap Friday afternoon when the XO's weekend readiness brief is scheduled for 1600 did not manage the week — the week managed them. The cycle that shapes the FT1's monthly rhythm is the weapons readiness brief cadence and the evaluation period. The weapons readiness brief happens on whatever schedule the weapons officer and department head have established — typically daily or weekly — and it is the primary accountability mechanism for the division's readiness posture. The evaluation period drives the eEVAL writing cycle; the FT1 who maintains running notes on each FT2 and FT3's performance over the period has eEVAL drafts that are ready to refine, not start from scratch, when the deadline arrives. During workup cycles, tactical readiness evaluations, and pre-deployment certification periods, the FT1's week becomes compressed: maintenance completion rates are tracked daily, certification currency is verified against the exercise schedule, and qualification readiness is a command-level metric. The FT1 who has been maintaining the division's readiness proactively throughout the non-workup period arrives at the evaluation window with a clean posture; the one who has been coasting arrives with a list of emergency action items.

Key Skills — How to Drill Each

  1. 01
    Run the division's fire control system readiness and torpedo tube operability — production schedule tracked in 3-M, deferred discrepancies actively managed, section readiness brief defensible at the weapons readiness board.
    The maintenance board is your operational picture — know it as well as the LCPO knows it. Every deferred discrepancy has an age, a parts status, and a projected completion; if you cannot answer those three questions for every open item when the weapons officer asks, the board is not being managed, it is being watched. The readiness brief to the weapons officer should never contain a surprise — if something has changed, you brief it before the scheduled review, not during it.
  2. 02
    Defend the weapons-handling certification currency and FCS qualification posture at weapons officer and department head level — zero sailors uncertified for the evolutions the boat needs them for.
    Maintain a personal tracking sheet, separate from the LCPO's division record, that shows every FT's certification currency, expiration dates, and next required training event. Review it weekly; compare it to the boat's upcoming evolution schedule. An FT whose certification expires two weeks before a scheduled weapons load is a gap that requires scheduling action now, not on the day the evolution is called. The weapons officer should never tell you about a certification gap — you should tell the weapons officer.
  3. 03
    Write eEVAL blocks the senior rater can defend at a wardroom board — measurable outcomes, action-result-impact language, the bullets the Chief board actually reads.
    Before writing the first word of an eEVAL block, document what the sailor actually did over the evaluation period: the specific maintenance actions they owned, the qualifications they earned, the evolutions they led, the sailors they trained and who those sailors became. The eEVAL block is built from that list, not from general impressions. Each bullet follows the action-result-impact pattern: action (what they did), result (the specific measurable outcome), impact (why it mattered to the mission or the crew). The LCPO who edits a well-constructed block makes small changes; the one who edits a generic block rewrites it from scratch.
  4. 04
    Mentor an FT2's NWAE cycle, commissioning program packet, or defense-contractor credentialing path from idea to selection — and counsel honestly when the path is wrong for the sailor.
    Start the mentoring conversation at the beginning of the evaluation period, not at the end of it. Ask each FT2 where they want to be at the end of the next patrol and what support they need to get there. When the answer is a commissioning program, pull the current NAVADMIN for the applicable program and walk through the requirements together — application window, package requirements, CO endorsement process, competitive factors. When the path is wrong for the sailor — when the academic history or the evaluation record does not support a competitive application — say so honestly and redirect. The FT1 who lets a sailor submit a non-competitive packet to avoid the uncomfortable conversation has not done the sailor a favor.
  5. 05
    Operate as the senior fire control watchstander and weapons coordinator during real-world operations — including the call to brief the XO or CO when the boat's FCS readiness has actually shifted.
    The weapons coordinator brief during a real-world operation is not the same as the exercise debrief. The CO and XO are making decisions based partly on the weapons readiness posture you are describing; the brief needs to be accurate, not optimistic. When FCS readiness has genuinely degraded — a system fault, a component degradation, a tube status change — brief it immediately and accurately, with the corrective action status and the projected resolution. The CO who is told the readiness is fine and later discovers it was not will not forget which LPO gave the brief.

Manuals & References — What Chapters Matter

  • Fire control system technical manuals (MK 117 or current-generation FCS) — full depth across the system
    At FT1 you are the technical authority the FT2s bring the hard fault to. Your technical manual familiarity needs to be broad enough to recognize a fault pattern that falls outside the standard fault-isolation procedure and narrow enough to trace a specific component failure to the root cause. The FT1 who lost technical depth during the LPO transition — who stopped reading the manual because the management work filled the day — is the one the weapons officer has to bypass to get a reliable technical opinion.
  • MK 48 ADCAP torpedo technical manuals and NAVSEA OD 45845 — Submarine Weapons and Ordnance System Safety Manual
    You own the weapons-handling program at the LPO level. The safety brief before every torpedo load/offload starts with you, and the standard you set in that brief is the standard the FT3s observe and apply when you are not present. Knowing the ordnance safety document well enough to brief from it, answer questions about it, and recognize when a procedure is departing from it is the LPO standard.
  • COMSUBFOR / SUBLANT / SUBPAC operational instructions and NAVSEAINST 8000-series guidance
    The standards the boat is measured against at the operational command level are the standards you are defending when you brief the weapons officer. Full familiarity with the applicable COMSUBFOR and SUBPAC instructions means you can explain not just what the standard is, but why it exists and what condition it was written to prevent.
  • MILPERSMAN — articles governing enlisted advancement, retention, NJP procedures, and personnel actions at FT1 visibility
    At FT1 you are in the room for conversations that have regulatory implications — advancement eligibility, administrative separation proceedings, NJP for performance or conduct violations. Knowing the MILPERSMAN framework means you can participate in those conversations accurately and counsel sailors correctly when their situations are approaching regulatory boundaries.
  • LDO/CWO accession guidance and STA-21 program requirements from current NAVADMIN cycles
    You are the mentor the FT2s come to with their first commissioning program question. The accession requirements, application windows, and competitive factors change each cycle; pull the current NAVADMIN before every mentoring conversation and update what you think you know. The FT1 who gives outdated commissioning program guidance — based on what the requirements were when they went through the process two years ago — does the sailor a disservice.

Standards — How to Hit Each

  • Chief board packet under construction with the LCPO's eye on every line; eEVAL profile defensible at department head and CO level.
    The Chief packet is built over the entire FT1 tour, not assembled in the ninety days before the board. From the first day of the FT1 billet, maintain a running file of specific outcomes: qualifications earned by the division, commissioning and advanced-pipeline placements, weapons-handling evolutions led, NWAE scores of FT3s you mentored, eEVAL blocks from your cycle that drove selection results. When the LCPO asks what is in the packet, the answer is a document, not a narrative.
  • Fire control system readiness and torpedo tube operability posture defensible at weapons officer and department head level every patrol cycle, no caveats.
    The standard is 'no caveats' — not 'few caveats' or 'explained caveats.' Every system on the boat has a readiness classification and a required maintenance schedule; the FT1 who maintains the production schedule, catches deferred items before they age into findings, and tracks parts pipelines proactively is the one whose brief never contains a surprise. The weapons officer who gets a surprise readiness caveat in the brief asks the FT1 when they knew about it; the answer should never be 'before the brief' without a corresponding prior notification.
  • Pipeline output — commissioning program, advanced qualification, or defense-contractor credential — producing at least one selectee or completion per year from the division.
    Identify the candidates in the first ninety days. Every FT2 who is performing above the baseline is a potential candidate for something — commissioning program, advanced NEC, defense-contractor credentialing path, submarine warrant pipeline. Start the conversation early; build the development plan together; make the chief's endorsement easy by producing specific outcomes that appear in the FT2's evaluation record.

Technical Mistakes — Concrete Consequences

  • Briefing FCS readiness numbers that have not been personally validated from the 3-M system.
    The weapons officer who finds a discrepancy between the brief and the actual 3-M status does not attribute the gap to the division — he attributes it to the FT1 who gave the brief. The Chief board packet that follows reflects a leadership trait deduction that the LCPO has to explain in the endorsement, and that explanation is harder to write than the finding was easy to avoid.
  • Allowing the weapons-handling certification currency tracking to fall to an FT2 as a delegated task without personal verification.
    When the FT2 transfers mid-patrol and the certification currency gap surfaces — an FT3 whose weapons-handling authorization lapsed and was not caught before the load evolution was scheduled — the finding lands under the LPO's name. Delegation is not abdication; the FT1 who delegates the tracking and does not personally verify the output at least weekly does not get to say the FT2 was responsible.
  • Allowing an informal shop standard on fire control system maintenance to substitute for the technical manual procedure.
    The submarine community's SIB is methodical. When an incident is investigated, the first question is whether the applicable technical manual procedure was followed, step for step, and whether the departure was authorized in writing. The FT1 who permitted a crew-developed shortcut to substitute for the published procedure is the LPO who owns the finding, regardless of how many patrols the shortcut worked without incident.
  • Going around the LCPO to the weapons officer or XO on a personnel or readiness issue.
    The chief's mess on a submarine is a small institution in a small community. The LCPO knows within the watch rotation. The next evaluation reflects it in the leadership trait block; the Chief board peers at the specific wording; and the FT1's reputation in the fire control rate circulates through the goat locker in ways that follow the record to the next boat.

Career Decisions at This Rank

  • Sit the Chief board at the first eligible opportunity or wait for a stronger record.
    The Chief board is a centralized MILPERSMAN-governed selection process that reviews the entire evaluated record. The first opportunity to sit the board arrives based on time-in-rate and performance eligibility thresholds; whether you should sit at the first opportunity or wait depends on the record as it actually exists, not as you hope it will look. The honest conversation with the LCPO — who has seen other Chief packets and knows what the board actually values — is the decision input that matters most. A strong FT1 who sits early with an incomplete packet and does not select has one more cycle to refine; but the cycle lost is a year, and in a competitive rate, it matters.
  • Submit an LDO or CWO commissioning program packet from the FT1 billet.
    The FT1 billet is the primary application window for the LDO (Limited Duty Officer) and CWO (Chief Warrant Officer) commissioning programs for submarine-qualified FTs. The application requires the CO's endorsement, a strong evaluated record, Dolphins, and the advanced qualifications that the selection board uses to differentiate competitive candidates. Pull the current NAVADMIN for LDO/CWO accession before building the packet; the requirements vary by cycle and by designation code. The FT1 who wants to pursue LDO in the submarine weapons community needs the CO's candid read on the competitiveness of the application — not the supportive language of an endorsement, but the honest assessment of whether the packet can compete.
  • Extend as LPO for a second FT1 tour or pursue a rotation to a different billet type (schoolhouse, SUBRON staff).
    A second LPO tour at a different command provides the breadth that a single-boat FT1 record may lack — different hull, different crew, different FCS baseline, different weapons officer. A schoolhouse or squadron staff billet provides a different kind of experience: broader exposure to multiple hulls and FCS configurations, instructor or analyst language in the evaluation, and a network in the fire control training community. Neither path is objectively better; the choice depends on what the Chief packet needs that the current record lacks and what the career counselor and the LCPO identify as the gap.

How the Seat Varies by Unit Type

  • Fast-attack submarine (SSN) LPO billet
    The archetypal FT1 tour. Small division, high operational tempo, direct exposure to the weapons officer and the department head daily. Every readiness gap and every strong performance is visible immediately. The fast-attack FT1 LPO tour is the one the Chief board expects to see in the record; it is the baseline against which other tour types are compared.
  • Ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) LPO billet
    The SSBN LPO tour offers a different operational profile — blue/gold crew rotation, strategic deterrence mission, predictable schedule — and a different kind of readiness standard. The blue/gold handoff is the accountability mechanism: the gold crew FT1 inherits the maintenance records and readiness posture the blue crew FT1 left. The comparison is informal but it is continuous, and the Chief's mess on both crews has the same standard.
  • Submarine weapons schoolhouse instructor billet
    The FT1 assigned to a formal schoolhouse is teaching fire control system curriculum to the next generation of FTs. The evaluation language emphasizes instructor production, course development, and student throughput rather than boat readiness and deployment performance. The Chief board reads this differently from an operational billet — not less favorably, but differently. The FT1 considering a schoolhouse billet should understand that the transition back to an operational LPO seat after schoolhouse will require a readiness-brief demonstration, not just a resume.
  • Submarine squadron (SUBRON) or type commander staff billet
    FT1s occasionally fill staff billets at the SUBRON or type commander level, providing fire control technical expertise to readiness assessments, weapons system evaluations, or training programs. These billets provide a broader view of the submarine fire control community than any single-boat LPO tour and build the network at the operational command level. The Chief packet narrative from a staff billet emphasizes analysis and enterprise-level impact rather than division readiness and deckplate execution — a different narrative, not a weaker one.

What Good Looks Like at This Rank

The good FT1 is the LPO the LCPO trusts to run the fire control division through a deployment without daily check-ins. His weapons readiness brief is accurate, his FCS and tube systems operability brief without caveat, and the weapons officer's only note after the department head review is 'looks good.' That outcome is not a coincidence — it is the result of a maintenance production schedule that is managed proactively, a certification currency tracker that the FT1 reviews weekly, and a discrepancy pipeline that is monitored against the boat's upcoming operation schedule rather than against the last inspection's findings. His FT2s are writing eEVALs that require small edits rather than rewrites, because the FT1 has been coaching the language — action-result-impact, measurable outcomes, no generic traits — since the first evaluation period began. His FT3s are qualifying on an accelerated schedule because the task demonstrators he trained are applying the standard he set. The weapons officer can leave the boat for a week and the fire control division's readiness posture will be the same when he returns, because the LPO does not require supervision to maintain it. His commissioning or advanced-qualification pipeline has produced a name the chief can mention in the packet endorsement. His eEVAL recommendations drove selection results that the weapons officer can quote. His weapons-handling safety culture on the torpedo room floor is the one the inspection team cites in the after-action brief as an example of how the program is supposed to run. He sits the Chief board with a record that reads itself — not because it was managed for optics, but because the actual work over the FT1 tour was done at that standard.

Preview — The Next Rank

Making Chief (CPOFT, E-7) is the career event that the submarine fire control community measures all FT1 tours against. The gold-fouled anchors change the institutional affiliation in a way no other promotion does: you enter the Chief's mess, which is not a social designation but a leadership institution with its own accountability culture, its own peer expectations, and its own role in the chain of command that sits adjacent to the wardroom rather than below it. As LCPO of a fire control division — or as the senior weapons chief on a submarine or squadron staff — the CPOFT runs the division rather than a section of it. The weapons officer's relationship changes: the CPOFT is the senior enlisted voice on fire control and weapons matters, not the LPO who defends the brief. The CO names the CPOFT in the readiness brief. The division's readiness, the FT1 LPO's performance, and the commissioning and qualification pipeline that the division produces are all CPOFT accountability. The Chief season — the induction period between selection and pinning — is an experience the submarine community treats seriously. The CPOFT who has not been through the Chief's mess induction, who arrives at the goat locker without having built the foundation in the FT1 tour, will feel the gap immediately. The submarine goat locker is a small community; every chief on the boat knows which CPOFT is carrying the standard and which is wearing the anchors.
FAQ

FT E6 — Frequently Asked Questions

Q01What does a E6 FT (Fire Control Technician) actually do?
You are LPO of the fire control division — the section of the weapons department responsible for the boat's fire control system readiness, torpedo tube operability, and the weapons-handling team's qualifications and certifications.
Q02What's the most important thing to know as a E6 FT?
FT1 is the LPO billet and the Chief packet year — simultaneously.
Q03What does a typical day look like for a E6 FT?
Time-blocked day at the E6 FT rank tier: 0530 Wake; review the overnight maintenance log and any discrepancies that came up on watch. If duty section ran an evolution overnight, review the 3-M entries before quarters, 0600–0630 Morning quarters: brief the division on the plan of the day, assign maintenance tasks to FT2s and FT3s, announce qualification sign-off opportunities, and communicate any readiness items that will affect the day's schedule, 0630–0800 Physical training. FT1 leads from the front on PT;…
Q04What mistakes get E6 FT soldiers fired or relieved?
Briefing FCS readiness numbers to the weapons officer that you have not personally validated from the 3-M system and the current maintenance log. The weapons officer catches the discrepancy once; the Chief packet reflects it permanently in the 'leadership judgment' trait; Allowing a certification lapse — an FT whose weapons-handling certification expired and was not tracked — to surface during a tactical readiness evaluation rather than being caught by the LPO's tracking system.…
Q05What career decisions matter most at the E6 FT rank tier?
Sit the Chief board at the first eligible opportunity or wait for a stronger record — The Chief board is a centralized MILPERSMAN-governed selection process that reviews the entire evaluated record. The first opportunity to sit the board arrives based on time-in-rate and performance eligibility thresholds; whether you should sit at the first opportunity or wait depends on the record as it actually exists, not as you hope it will look. The honest conversation with the LCPO — who has seen other Chief packets and knows what the board actually values — is the decision input that matters most.…
Q06What's next after E6 for a FT (Fire Control Technician) in the Navy?
Making Chief (CPOFT, E-7) is the career event that the submarine fire control community measures all FT1 tours against.
Q07What manuals and regulations does a E6 FT need to know cold?
Fire control system technical manuals (MK 117 or current-generation FCS) across the system depth the division maintains: you are the technical authority the FT2s bring the hard fault to.; MK 48 ADCAP torpedo technical manuals and the NAVSEA OD 45845 ordnance safety manual: you own the weapons-handling program at the LPO level and the safety brief starts with you.; COMSUBFOR / SUBLANT / SUBPAC operational instructions on FCS readiness, weapons system reporting,…

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Published by the Honest MOS Editorial DeskVerified against DoD/.gov sourcesUpdated May 2026Editorial standards